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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
ARCHIE BECKSTROM and 
ELIZABETH BECKSTROM, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
ARTHUR LIVINGSTON and 
DIANTHA LIVINGSTON, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
CASE 
NO. 8646 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In this case most of the facts are disputed, and the 
evidence is conflicting. 
The appellants contend that on or about December 30, 
1947, the appellant, Arthur Livingston, entered into an oral 
arrangement with the respondent, Archie Beckstrom, for 
the possession and sale of part of appellant's property as 
follows: 
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367 head of ewe sheep at $20.00 per head ... $ 7,340.00 
7 hea.d of buck sheep at $30.00 per head. . . 210.00 
900 head desert gmzing permit at $2.50 
per head . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,250.00 
283 acres of land and water rights in Utah 
County, Utah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8,000.00 
Total purchase price .... $17,800.00 
A credit of $1,600.00 on the purchase price was allowed 
by appellant to respondent ($900.00 at the rate of $1.00 
for each head of sheep permit and $700.00 for previously 
feeding and herding of appellant's sheep by respondent for 
estimated expenses to be incurred in drilling a water well 
on the land sold and for the caring for the sheep then in 
possession of respondent but belonging to appellant (Tr. 93 
to 102, Exhibits D-13, D-14, D-15). As part of said oral 
arrangement, respondent was to pay five per cent interest 
per annum on the unpaid balance and respondent was to 
continue to run appellants' sheep for him and to submit a 
start:ement of the actual costs of the appellants' share of 
the water well and herding expense. At the same time, 
respondent owed appellant $100.00 for lambs sold to ap-
pellant (Tr. 46, 47, 94, 119, 157, Exhibit D-14, T. 76, 201). 
Respondent paid $6,300.00 on the oral arrangement up to 
June 1, 1949 (T. 194, E~hibit D-14). On or about June 1, 
1949, tlhe parties entered into a written agreement which 
states a purchase price of $10,000.00 for the foregoing de-
scribed property including the same number of sheep. That 
no settling of accounts was had between the parties and no 
accounting of the charges and credits of $1,600.00 on the 
water well and herding expense was attempted until Oc-
tober, 1953 (T. 71, 72, 119, 188, 195). 
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Appellant also contends that he bought 97 head of 
sheep in October and November of 1950, which sheep re ... 
spondent agreed to and did herd and run for appellant on 
the ground and permits that respondent was purchasing 
from appellant. The wool shorn from these sheep in the 
Spring of 1951 was sold by appellant as his wool from his 
sheep for $712.00 (T. 69, 70, 188, 189). Said 97 head olf 
sheep were turned over to respondent pursuant to ~an agree-
ment between the parties and appellant gave a credit to 
respondent f.or $526.24 of the wool money on interest (T. 
8 to 16, 64 to 68, EX!hihit P-2). Respondent paid in cash $9,-
481.25 on principal and interest on the contract between 
June 1, 1949, and January 12, 1953 (T. 7). Appellant paid 
certain taxes, assessments and grazing fees due against 
the property being soJd and used by respondent and which 
respondent was obligated and assumed to pay. Respondent 
paid most of said taxes, assessments and grazing fees di-
rectly to the parties entttled thereto and repaid appellant 
for some orf the same which appellant advru1ced, but appel-
lant claims a credit for advancements not repaid and in-
terest thereon as follows: 
GeneTal taxes on }and sold for 1953 and 1954 .. $ 89.17 
General taxes on 1and sold for 1955.......... 48.17 
Strawberry water assessments for 1950. . . . . . . 68.71 
Strawberry water assessments for 1951. . . . . . . 49.41 
Bureau olf Land Management grazing fees for 
respondent's share for 1951. . . . . . . . . . . . . 72.00 
Bureau of Land Management grazing fees for 
respondent's share for 1950............. 72.00 
Taxes orf $187.50 paid by respondent for 1948 
due under contract for property bought by 
respondent burt credited as a contract pay-
ment less $87.02 on appellant's home tax 100.48 
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(See Point III on appeal.) 
The respondents tendered by letter of their attorney 
dated October 15, 1953, the sum of $1,000.00, less $80.00 
paid on appellant's 1949 home taxes, in final payment on 
the amount due on the contract, (Exhibit D-4) which ten-
der was not accepted by appellanlts as the same was sub-
stantially insufficient. 
The U.S. Bureau of Land Management in 1953, prior 
to the alleged tender, reappraised the nwnber of head of 
sheep that could be grazed on the land being sold to re-
spondents and reduced the same from 900 head to 700 head 
while the respondents were in full use of said grazing per-
mits and the permit for 700 head was issued in the name 
of respondent Beckstrom (T. 19 to 20, 63 to 64, 111 to 117, 
Ex:hibit D-17). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING 
THAT ON THE FIRST DAY OF JUNE, 1949, THERE 
WAS DUE, OWING AND UNPAID TO THE APPEL-
LANTS FROM THE RESPONDENTS THE SUM OF $10,-
000.00. 
POINT II 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING 
THAT IF PAYMENT HAD NOT BEEN MADE, THAT 
THE CONTRACT O'F JUNE 1, 1949, WAS AN ACCORD 
AND SATISFACTION OF THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT 
BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
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POINT III 
THAT APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO CREDIT 
FOR THE AMOUNTS OF TAXES, GRAZING FEES AND 
WATER ASSESSMENTS AND INSTALLMENTS PAID, 
'J10GETHIER WITH INTEREST THEREON AT THE 
RATE OF TEN PER CENT PER ANNUM FROM THE 
DATES PAID, WHICH AMOUNTS EXCEED THE SUM 
OF $186.50 ALLOWED BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
POINT IV 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING 
THAT APPELLANTS SOLD WOOL AND RECEIVED 
$714.16 THEREFOR AND AGREED THAT RESPOND-
ENTS SHOULD HAVE CREDIT ON THE CONTRACT 
IN THE AMOUNT OF $714.16. 
POINT V 
THAT THE BALANCE OF $1,381.14 OWING ON THE 
CONTRACT AS OF MARCH 1, 1952, AS FOUND BY THE 
TR[AL COURT IS ERRONEOUS AND THE TENDER 
OF 1953 AND 1955 IS INSUFFICIENT, AND THE TRI-
AL COURT ERRED IN DECREEING SPECIFIC PER-
FORMANCE OF SA]D CONTRACT AND ALLOW-
ING RESPONDENTS THEIR ATTORNEYS FEES AND 
COSTS, AND APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO THEIR 
ATIORNEYS FEES AND COSTS. 
POINT VI 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING 
THAT THE GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY IN CHARGE 
OF DESERT PERMITS MADE A RE-APPRAISAL OF 
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THE 1'-WMBER OF HEAD THAT COULD BE GRAZED 
AND REDUCED THE SAME TO 835 HEAD AND THIAT 
APPELLANTS SHOULD CONVEY 135 HEAD GRAZING 
PERMIT TO THE RESPONDENTS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING 
THAT ON THE FIRST DAY OF JUNE, 1949, THERE 
WAS DUE, OWING AND UNPAID TO THE APPEL-
LANTS FROM THE RESPONDENTS THE SUM OF $10,-
000.00. 
In the Complaint and Amended Complaint of respond-
ents, a contract between the parties dated June 1, 1949, 
for a purchase price in the sum of $10,000.00 is pleaded 
and that $6,200.00 had been previously paid on said pur-
chase price (R. 4, 26). In the Reply (R. 17), respondents 
allege a written agreement for said sale about January 1, 
1948, for $16,200.00. Said written memorandum (Exhib~t 
D-19) states a total consideration of $16,200.00 for said 
sale, though respondent admits (T. 23-25) that appellant 
owed him at the same time certain accounts for herding 
and hauling appellants' sheep and driving a water well on 
the land being purchased, and that respondent verbally 
agreed to pay at least four per cent interest from Decem-
ber 30, 1947, on said purchase price (T. 23). Appellant 
contends that respondent agreed to pay five per cent in-
terest thereon and that a credit was allowed of $1,600.00 
in addition to the $16,200.00 for said unsettled accounts 
on an original consideration of $17,800.00, wth the under-
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standing that a statement of said charges would be sub-
mitted by respondent to appellant as soon as the figures 
and shares thereof became available. (See Statement of 
Facts for references). At least appellant was entitled to 
proof (1953 Utah Code Annotated, Rule 9C) of the pay-
ment alleged and computation of the interest prior to June 
1, 1949, but the record does not establish nor account how 
a balance of $10,000.00 as of June 1, 1949, was reached 
except for the naked statement of that figure in the writ-
ten contract of that date. The fact of the $1,600.00 credit 
is substantiated by notations made by appellant at the time 
and the admission by respondent of the existence of ac-
counts owing at the time. The agreement of appellant to 
share the oost of the water well is grounded in the fact that 
part of the agreement was that respondent continue to run 
appellants' sheep as was done in 1950 and 1951, and none 
of these accounts were ever settled (T. 27-28, 119-120). 
The fact that the credit for the cost of the well and sheep 
herding prior to 1949 was brought up in 1953 substanti-
ates that there was no meeting of the minds when the con-
tract of June 1, 1949, was signed (T. 188, 194-195). The 
fact that the detailed expense claimed by respondent (T. 24-
43) and owing by appellant hadn't yet been figured by re-
spondent according to his testimony from his deposition pri-
or to the computation O!f $558.00 in 1953 (T. 71-73) and the 
fact that the additional amount of $200.00 claimed and 
charged for hauling sheep of appellant in 194 7 was baseless 
inasmuoh as the independent witness Lucero testified he 
drove appellant's sheep to Strawberry in 1947 (T. 86-88), 
both negate the claim that the accounts had been settled or 
agreed before June 1, 1949, and further show thart there 
had been no meeting of the minds of the parties. "Pay-
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ment" of the amounts due appellant before June 1, 1949, 
has not been shown by respondent and the balance owing 
with interest, yet still allowing full credit to respondent 
for the whole $1,600.00, would be appro~tely $10,800,00 
as of June 1, 1949. 
It should be kept in mind that any amounts owing by 
appellant to respondent for the well expenses and water 
improvements and for herding and hauling sheep prior to 
June 1, 1949, depend solely on the agreement of appellant 
to pay respondent therefor, as respondent's theory holds 
that these items were separate from the contract but were 
offset and settled as a means of reaching the $10,000.00 
figure in the contract of June 1, 1949. What respondent 
is actually claiming is not payment at all, but that some-
thing other than payment was accepted in satisfaction 
of or in lieu of payment or that something less than what 
was due was agreed to satisfy the original obligation (T. 
201-202). This amounts to an attempt to plead an accord 
and satisfaction instead of "payment" which will be dis-
cussed in Point II. See Continental Gin Co. v Arnold, 153 
Pac. 160 (Okla..). The evidence is uncontroverted that the 
credit of $1600.00 for these items was never settled and 
that appellant's agreement to pay for these items was never 
met by resJX>ndent's accounting therefor and that the 
amounts have always been disputed. If the parties could 
make an agreement for $16,200.00 "total consideration" 
with these items being owing, but unsettled and unpaid as 
of December 30, 1947, with no provision to account for the 
same, then it is just as possible that the parties could state 
the figure of $10,000.00 consideration when they reduced 
the agreement to writing on Jnne 1, 1949, still not provid-
ing for the settlement or accounting of these admitted 
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items. The record is peculiarly silent as to any figures or 
amounts of settlement on the charges made for the well 
and improvements, sheep herding charges, interest, lamb 
credit of $100.00 owing appellant, at the time the $10,000.00 
figure was arrived at. Surely the respondent, with such a 
good memory of facts, figures, values and dealings with 
appellant in this record, could indicate the details of how 
the $10,000.00 figure was arrived at, instead of making 
the assertion that it was done and that is all he can recall 
about it (T. 41). In fact, Mr. Beckstrom could not recall 
even where this accounting with Mr. Livingston took place! 
(T. 39). 
POINT II 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING 
THAT IF PAYlVJ.ENT HAD NOT BEEN MADE, THAT 
THE CONTRACT OF JUNE 1, 1949, WAS AN ACCORD 
AND SATISFACTION OF THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT 
BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
While the Complaint and Amended Complaint claim 
"payment," the Reply to Counterclai·m (R. 17) and mo-
tion of respondent (T. 88-89) daim that the written con-
tract of June 1, 1949, constituted an accord and satisfac-
tion between the parties. 
"Accord and satisfaction" requires the party relying 
thereon to prove the accord and satisfaction and requires 
a meeting of the minds of the parties and a consideration, 
while in this case neither factor is present. Also, the new 
contract has not been performed by respondent according 
to the terms thereof, and the accord and satisfaction has 
thus failed and is of no force or effect. The respondent, 
Mr. Beckstrom, has been delinquent in his payments as to 
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time and amount, and he still owes, by his own admission, 
about $1,000.00 on the contract (T. 190-191), though time 
is of the essence of the agreement (T. 7, Exhibit D-15). 
If the accord has failed, then the full amount of the original 
obligation is due. A tender of performance of an accord, 
executed in part only, is insufficient. (1 Am. Jur. 216-217, 
240, 251-255, 260-261 on Accord and Satisfaction). 
There is no evidence in the contract of June 1, 1949, 
that a dispute was being settled or that the contract was 
a compromise or a settlement. "Acceptance of the exe-
cution of the accord is the sine qua non of a plea of accord 
and satisfaction". Continental Gin Company vs. Arnold, 
153 Pac. 160 ( Okla) . This case also criticizes the use of 
the word "payment" as merely denominating in legal con-
templation an attempt to plead "accord and satisfaction." 
In the case at bar the difficulty seems to be that the ap-
pellant refuses to accept the executory accord and cannot 
now be satisfied with a tender of performance. All the 
cases hold that where a creditor agrees to accept a l~r 
swn than is actually due him or where a new contract is 
consistent with a continuance of a former one and only 
provides a new method of discharging the former one, it 
has no effect until it is performed. No new consideration 
was paid to appellant for entering into the agreement of 
June 1, 1949. 
Ashton v. Skeen, 85 Utah 489, 39 Pac. 2nd 1073; Brown-
ing v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 72 Pac. 2nd 1060 
(Utah) ; Smoot v. Checketts, 41 Utah 211, 125 Pac. 412, 
Ann. Cas. 1915C, 1113; Williston on Contracts, 129. 
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POINT III 
THAT APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO CREDIT 
FOR THE AMOUNTS OF TAXES, GRAZING FEES AND 
WATER ASSESSMENTS AND INSTALLMENTS PAID, 
'IDGETHER WITH INTEREST THEREON AT THE 
RATE OF TEN PER CENT PER ANNUM FROM THE 
DATES PAID, vVHICH AMOUNTS EXCEED THE SUM 
OF $186.50 ALLOWED BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
According to Ex:hibit D-15, the respondent buyer agreed 
to pay all taxes and water assessments and forr desert per-
mits of every kind and nature which are assessed or may 
be assessed orr may become due on all of the real and per-
sonal p11operty described in the contract, and that the ap-
pellant seller upon default of any of said payments, may 
pay the same and charge the said buyer therefor, together 
with ten per ,cenrt interest from date of said payments. Pur-
suant to this agreement, respondent undertook and did pay 
hereunder most of the annual payments of taxes, water 
assessments and desert grazing fees, except the credits 
claimed by appeUant in the Statement of Fact. The re-
spondent always considered these matters as his obligation, 
and when he did not pay the same directly to the parties 
entitled thereto, he reimbursed appellant for most of said 
charges after appellant paid the same. The water assess-
ments included 1:Jhe so-called "construction charges" of the 
Strawberry Water Users Association, and were so paid by 
respondent and considered as water assessments until dur-
ing the trial of this cause respondent discovered that per-
haps he could charge appellant for construction charges 
because of the statement orf the court, and afte'r the trial 
respondent amended his Complaint to so charge (T. 52-61, 
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189-190, R. 27, 47, Exhibits D-5, 7, 8). Appellant did pay 
the delinquent assessment, including construction charges 
for the years 1950 and 1951 which were not repaid by re-
spondent and for which appellant claims a credit (T. 77-78, 
108-109, Exhibit D-16). Respondent knew of the Straw-
berry Water appurtenant to the land and t.haJt its construc-
tion oharges are prorated over a period of years in the 
nature of an annual assessment because water is wirfuheld 
if not paid and the amount is largely offset by the power 
and grazing dividends earned by the Association (T. 182, 
Exhibits D-15, 20). Respondent, by his knowledge and 
conduct, is estopped from claiming he is not obligated to 
pay the water assessments of every kind and nature, which 
include construction charges. 
Exhibit D-17 shows the billings of the Bureau of Land 
Management on all of the government grazing permits be-
longing to appellant, and includes payments by appellant 
for the years 1950 and 1951 on the 900 head grazing per-
mit used and being pw~chased by respondent. These pay-
ments by appellant \\rere made December 6, 1949, and ])e.. 
cember 29, 1950, both in the sum of $113.12, a year in ad-
vance as required by the BLM. The fee rate was eight 
cents per head for the South Dugway Unit 900 head per-
mit, which fee totals $72.00 for respondent's share of the 
billing to be paid in 1949 and 1950 for the years 1950 and 
1951, respectively. The evidence is nncontroverted that 
appellant paid these fees and is entitled to a credit of $144.00 
therefor; the fees to be paid in 1951 and 1952 in advance 
for the years 1952 and 1953, respectively, were paid by re-
spondent (T. 62-63, 113-117, 123, Exhibit D-17). Respond· 
ent repaid appellant in 1948 and 1949 for the grazing per· 
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mit for the years 1948 and 1949 (T. 52-53, 55, 58, Exhibits 
D-7, 8). 
Appellant gave credit on the oonrtract :f.ior $187.50 paid 
by respondent November 28, 1949, on general taxes on the 
land described in the conrtract and including $87.02 on ap-
pellant1S home rbaxes in Spanish Fork which was nort in-
cluded in the contract of sale (T. 7, 58, 103). Under the 
contract of sale, the respondent owed these taxes on the 
land being purchased, so that $100.48 of the $187.50 should 
not be credited on the c<mtmct and appellant is entitled to 
a credit therefor (Exhibits D-15 and P-1). 
Exhibit D-10 shows that the general taxes on the land 
being sold herein were paid by appellant for the years 1953 
and 1954 on the day they became delinquent (T. 61-62). 
The taxes for 1955 were paid by appellant on the day be-
fore they became delinquent, and respondent claims he paid 
the same an the last day (T. 106-107). Appellant is entitled 
to a credit on the amormrts paid on taxes for the years 1953, 
1954 and 1955, in the sum of $137.34. 
The lower court awarded a credit of $186.50 to appel-
lants on taxes, grazing and water assessments (R. 48), but 
appellants are entitled to credits of the amounts paid there-
on as set forth in the Statement of Fraots and based on the 
evidence herein, together with infte,rest on said amounts 
from the daJtes paid at the raJte of ten per cent per annum 
as provided in the oontract. 
POINT IV 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING 
THAT APPELLANTS SOLD WOOL AND RECEIVED 
$714.16 THEREFOR AND AGREED THAT RESPOND-
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ENTS SHOULD HAVE CREDIT ON THE CONTRACT 
IN THE AMOUNT OF $714.16. 
Another sore spot between the parties has been the 
97 head of sheep bought by appellant in the fall of 1950 
and turned over to respondent as his own sheep with the 
increase after June, 1951 (T. 8-16, 64-76, 103-106). Mr. 
Livingston took the wool which Mr. Beckstrom had sheared 
from :these sheep and sold the same as his own wool (T. 
129-133). Mr. Beckstrom admits that the sheep belonged 
to Mr. Livingston, as did the wool (T. 189). At any rate, 
the e~act nature of this sheep account had not been settled 
by the parties until the trial of the case when appellant 
withdrew his Cross-Complaint on the sheep account (R. 
14-15, 20), and the payments of $1615.00 advanced by re-
spondent were taken off as credit on the contract. 
On or about February 19, 1952, appellant signed a 
memerandum before respondent's attorney purporting to 
give a credit of $526.24 on the wool money for interest on 
the contract (Exhibit P-2). Not until the trial did respond-
ent Beckstrom claim the difference between this amount 
and what the wool actually was supposed to have sold for 
(T. 13-14, 69-70). It should also be noted that appellant 
stipulated $712.00 was received for the wool, and not $714.16 
(T. 13-14, 129), and there is no other evidence as to total 
receipt. 
At best, the parties could be said_ to have settled this 
sheep account when the statement on Exhibit P-2 was 
signed in 1952 giving $526.24 credit for the wool on interest, 
as the aotual inte-rest is about $150.00 more than the 
$526.24, by computation. There is no evidence of an agree-
ment to do otherwise with respect to a credit of the full 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
amount of $712.00 received for the wool sold by appellant 
from his sheep, except, of course, again, tlhe claim by re-
spondent that he was to receive the wool money (T. 15). 
Certainly it cannot be s~own that appellanrt agreed to any 
such settlement. lVIr. Beckstrom still owed Mr. Livingston 
money on the contract in 1952, and irt would have been jusrt 
as easy to credit $712.00 on the oontracrt in Exhibit P-2 as 
the $526.24, if that were the agreement and inrtention of the 
parties. Apparently it is all right for Mr. Becksrtrom to 
claim "selttlemoot" of former accounts by acclamation only 
and a written figure (as with the $10,000.00 contract of 
June 1, 1949), burt the same standard does not apply to a 
"setJtlement" and written memorandum witJh lVIr. Livingston. 
There was a genuine dispute on this sheep account, 
and the written memoflandtun, questionable as it is, cannot 
be expanded to imply something that wa:s never intended. 
POINT V 
THAT THE BALANCE OF $1,381.14 OvVING ON THE 
CONTRACT AS OF MARCH 1, 1952, AS FOUND BY THE 
TRIAL COURT IS ERRONEOUS AND THE TENDER 
OF 1953 AND 1955 IS INSUFFICIENT, AND THJE TRI-
AL COURT ERRED IN DECREEING SPECIFIC PER-
FORMANCE OF SAID CONTRACT AND ALLOW-
ING RESPONDENTS THEIR ATTORNEYS FEES AND 
COSTS, AND APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO THEIR 
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS. 
Appellants contend that the amount of $1,381.14 found 
owing on the contract as of March 1, 1952, is erroneous 
for the reasons set for1Jh in this brief hereinabove. Appar-
ently, the trial court allowed the full $714.16 on the wool 
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apply against ~the computed balance owing and then found 
thaJt respondents tendered (presumably October 15, 1953) 
the full bal·ance owing, (R. 47-48), and then goes on to say 
that "thereafter the defendants (appellants) became en-
titled to a credirt against plaintiffs (respondenrts) by reason 
of paymenrt of taxes on the land described in the contract, 
by reason of payment of desert permirt assessments for 
sheep grazing privileges, and for payments made on Straw-
berry Water assessments in the sum total of $186.50, mak-
ing a balance due to rthe defendants (appellants) of $902.27". 
From the Statemenrt of Facts heTein and in Point III on 
appeal irt: appeaTS that all tJhe credirts claimed by appellants 
for taxes, grazing fees and water assessments accrued prior 
to the darte of the tender in 1953, except the general taxes 
totJalling $89.16 for the years 1953 and 1954. No expla-
nation of how tJhe $186.50 is computed, or which items it 
represents, is given, nor whetJher ten per cent interest or 
any interest was allowed as required by the contract of 
June 1, 1949. The payments on water assessments and on 
desert grazing privileges for the year in advance had to 
be made so that respondents would be able to use the wa-
ter and grazing (Exhibits D-17, 20). Surely tJhe appellants 
are entitled to credit for these principal amounts of $262.12 
fior water and grazing assessments for 1950 and 1951 and 
paid prior to rthe date of the letter of tender of October 15, 
1953. Appellants are entitled to the general taxes which 
they paid of $89.16 for the years 1953 and 1954, plus ten 
per cent interest thereon to be added to any final setJtle-
menrt figure. Appellanrts are also entitled to interest on tJhe 
total unpaid balance until the same is paid in full. 
The filing of the Amended Complaint related the claim 
for $3,080.85 damages for construction charges of the 
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Strawberry Water right back tJO the beginning of the law-
suit and would have the effect of waiving the legal advan-
tages of any tender made by the purchasers, BeckStrom. 
The purchasers, reSJpOndernts, changed their position and 
their 'theory of the lawsuit by filing for damages (R. 26-32). 
This amended claim relates back to the date of the original 
Complaint according to Rule 15C of 1Jhe Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953. Respondents cannot daim damages and a 
$3,080.85 credit, so obviously an afterthought, and main-
tain at the same time they have paid the contract balance 
and tendered the agreed amount due on the written agree-
ment (T. 189-190, R. 27). This relief contended for by the 
respondents was not gvanted beoause of the conduct of re-
spondents in paying on these construction charges and 
knowing that the parties under their contract contemplated 
the buyers assuming the same as water assessments as de-
scribed in •the contract (See Point III on appeal). The po-
sition of respondents on ·tih:i:s matter is another indication 
that there never was a meeting of the minds of the parties 
when the contract of June 1, 1949, was drawn. 
Time was made the essence of the written agreement 
of June 1, 1949, and the payments were tJO be made strictly 
within the times provided, though they were not paid as 
agreed (T. 7, Exhibits P-1, D-15). The last paymenJt under 
the contract was to be paid by October 1, 1953, though ·the 
tenders of purohasers were not made until afiteT October 
15, 1953 (Exmbit D-4). 
"If time is of the essence, no question of delay of laches, 
using these words with regard to their true meaning, 
can properly arise. If time is essential, the stipulation 
of the eontraot must be exactly complied with; not the 
delay, but the failure to perform at the e~act day, cuts 
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off the righrt of defuulting party." (Pomeroy on Specific 
Perrormance, Section 399. 
"Time may be essential. It is so whenever the intention 
01f the parties is clear that the performance of its terms 
shall be accomplished exactly at the stipulated day. 
The intention must then govern. A delay cannot be 
e~cused. A perfonnance at the time is essential; any 
default will defeat the right to a specific performance." 
Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, Volume 4, Section 
1408. See also Vo~ume 6, Section 1811. Opuses cited 
in Roberts v. Braffett, 33 Utah Reports 51, 63-65. 
Appellants have tendered back and do now tender to 
respondents all monies paid under said oral and written 
agreements by respondents and offered to cancel the said 
contract (R. 14). 
Inasmuch as 'the tenders herein from respondents have 
been insufficient, or not in rtime, or waived by respondents, 
or inasmuch as the contract should not be specifically en-
forced, the respondents are not entitled to attorneys fees 
and costs against these appellants. Where respondents 
were not allowed damages for a "construction charges" lien 
on the property nor for cut-down of the grazing permit 
while they were using the same, they are not entitled to 
attorneys fees and costs for not getting the relief for which 
they filed suit in enforcing the contract, as the appellants 
have nort defaulted in any of the <.."'Ovenants and agreements 
contained in the contract. 
On the other hand, appellants are entitled to attorneys 
fees ru1d costs for enforcing the contract provisions as to 
the amounts due them unde·r the contract. 
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POINT VI 
THAT TilE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING 
THAT THE GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY IN CHARGE 
OF DESERT PERMITS MAJDE A RE-APPRAISAL OF 
THE NUMBER OF HEAD THAT COULD BE GRAZED 
AND REDUCED THE SAME TO 835 HEAD AND THAT 
APPELLANTS SHOULD CONVEY 135 HEAD GRAZING 
PERMIT TO THE RESPONDENTS. 
The trial court found that before the tender of the bal-
ance due on the contract, the government had re-appraised 
the number of head of sheep that 'Oould be carried by the 
property and reduced the same to 835 head from 900 head, 
and that the reduction was made while respondenrts were 
using the peTrnit and that the reduction was made without 
the fault of appellants. The record shows by Mr. Beck-
strom's own testimony that the Bueau of Land Management 
re-checked the commensurate carrying capacity of the prop-
erty being sold under the oonrtract and that said B. L. M. 
transferred 700 head to Mr. Beckstrom (T. 19-20). The 
appellant, Mr. Livingston, in addition to the land being 
sold under contract, owns 160 acres commensurate prop-
erty in Sanpete County which is base for 135 units of sheep 
permirt (T.111-114, Exhibit D-17). This land belonging to 
the appellant would be made practically valueless if the 
sheep pennit were transfe1rred away from the same to some-
one who had commensurate property to which the pern1i:t 
could be atmached, but the transfer of grazing permit de-
pends on the Bureau of Land Management and the permits 
are strictly a license whioh may be raised or lowered or ter-
minated by the government (T. 167-168). The permit as 
shown on the last page of Exhibirt D-17 srtates, among other 
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things, as follows: "This permit is subject to temporary 
adjustment if the necessity arises to protect or conserve the 
public lands affected." 
The intention of the parties should be considered as a 
whole as to the intention of the parties. The contraot was 
an agreement to sell a sheep operation consisting of land, 
water righrts and sheep grazing permits. It was intended 
that this unit be sold, delivered and used as ra unit as was 
aotually done unrtil1953 when a re-appraisement was made 
of the carrying capacity of the property and the permit re-
duced from 900 head to 700 head. The appellants delivered 
the use of rail of the grazing permits, consisting of 900 head, 
on rthe property being sold to respondents, and the re-evalu-
atioo occurred during respolll!dents' use of said property 
and permits. The buyer received the constructive permit 
for 900 head grazing privileges, as was contemplated under 
the contract, and any change depended upon the evaluation 
of the government ragency. The land is still subject to gov-
ernmental re-appmisal, and the number of head may be in-
creased back to 900 head, depending on conditions of graz-
ing useage, and depends on the water shed and specific 
physical conditions. The buyer used 1lhe whole permit. for 
900 head tmtil 1953, when the re-appraisal was made. The 
appellants tmnsferred what they had and what they inten-. 
ded to be sold, and have no control over re-appraisal by 
the government agency. The 135 units owned on the Dug-
way permit are in addition to, separate from, and have 
nothing to do With the original 900 head permit whidl was 
delivered to and used by respo!Ildents (T. 111-112). It 
would be inequitable to order appellants to transfer this 
135 head merely because respondents happen to own addi-
tional base property to which the same nlighrt be attached, 
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and thel['eby ruin the use and value of the other property 
belonging to appellants. 
"If the conditions have been substantially perlormed 
and the benefit of the contract fully secured to the 
opposite party, equity has oonsidm-ed iit sufficient. A 
party ~who has done all that can reasooobly be e~c­
ted of him to perform his part of an agreement will 
be considered in equity as having performed it." 12 
Am. Jur. 902-903, Contracts, Sec. 343. 
"A contract which is legal in its inception but becomes 
illegal by subsequent statutory enaotmem [or by sub-
sequent lawful acts of public authority] is wholly ter-
minated as soon as the staJtute takes efifect even though 
the time specified for its perrfonnance has not yet fully 
expired, and no action can be ~maintained by either 
party for failure to perform the obligations of the con-
tract after the illegality has aJttJcmhed." 12 Am. Jur. 
955-956, Contracts, Sec. 379. 
In reality, if appellants are ordered to transfer 135 head 
grazing permit in addition to the grazing permirt ~or the 
property being sold, respondents will receive more than was 
intended or ~agreed upon under the original contract. If 
respondents are dissatisfied wirth what has happened, the 
appellants are perfectly willing 1Jo oonsider the contract at 
an end 'as set forth by the above authorities, and hereby 
tender re-payment of the monies received in return for the 
possession of the property in its present condition. By in-
sisting on 1Jhe additional sheep permit, respondents show 
that they are trying to obtain samertfuing to which they are 
not enti1:lled, with no regard f!or the rights of appellants and 
1Jhe original intenrtion of the parties. Tlliis disagreement 
again shows tJhart there was no meeting of the minds on the 
written conrtract provisions of June 1, 1949. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is readily apparent that the parties hereto have not 
agreed on most of the issues in this case, and it is difficult 
to find any evidence where there was any clear settlement 
or positive agreement. Respondents have testified of such 
agreements, but the record is absent of proof of positive 
agreements or statements of accounting produced for ap-
pellants. Respondents claim that the adjustment credit 
should be deducted from the original contract price of $16,-
200.00, and appellants claim that the adjustment credits 
should be deducted from 1Jhe original contract price oif $17,-
800.00, wmch figure includes a $1,600.00 amount of credit 
fur such purpose. 
The appellants are entitled to the credits shown by the 
evidence, including those for taxes, grazing fees and water 
assessments paid fur the account of respondents and other-
wise set fortJh in this brief, and that the Counterclaim of 
appellants should be re-instated and the relief given as 
prayed fior in said Counterclaim, including reasonable at-
torneys fees and costs incurred herein, and for such other 
relief as to the Court may seem just and equitable. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DEAN W. PAYNE, 
Attorney for Appellants 
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